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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
VERDEAN ILAS CARTER,

Case No. 15278

Defendant-Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction of theft by receiving,
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-408 (1953), attempted theft by extortion, Utah
Code Ann. §76-6-406 (1953) and being a habitual criminal, Utah Code
Ann. §76-8-1001 (1953), in the Third District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable James S. Sawaya,
presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE

LOY~R

COURT

The appellant, Verdean Ilas Carter, was convicted by
a jury of the crimes of theft by receiving and attempted theft by
extortion on May 19, 1977, before the Honorable James S. Sawaya
of the Third Judicial District Court.

On June 8, 1977, the

appellant was convicted of being an habitual criminal by the
Honorable James S. Sawaya of the Third Judicial District Court.
The appellant was sentenced by the court to serve one to fifteen
years in the Utah State Prison, for the indeterminate term of
imprisonment provided by law, for the crime of theft by receiving,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

not more than five years at the Utah State Prison, the indetermina•
term of imprisonment provided by law for the crime of attempted
theft by extortion, and five years to life imprisonment in the
Utah State Prison, the indeterminate term of imprisonment provided
by law for the crime of being an habitual criminal, the sentences
to be served concurrently.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment of guilt
entered against him and a new trial, and in the case of his
habitual criminal conviction, a dismissal of the charge based on
its unconstitutionality.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS

•

Sometime between the closing of the business on Friday,
February 18, 1977, and 7:00a.m. on Saturday, February 19, 1977,
Sterling H. Nelson & Sons, a wholesale and retail grain store,
was burglarized

(TR 21-22).

The safe inside the building was

broken into and two days worth of receipts were among the items
missing

(TR 22 ) .

The receipts consisted of the customer's

checks stapled to invoices (TR 22-23).

The value of the checks

stolen was estimated by .the company at thirty to thirty-five
thousand dollars

(TR 27) .

The procedure followed by the company did not include
a separate recording of the name and address of customers paying
by check (TR 23); thus, without the checks and receipts, there was
no way of determining who paid by check and the burglary resulted
in a substantial loss for the company

(TR 23, 26-27, 38-39, 41).

At approximately 11:00 a.m. on the morning the burglary
was discovered, Lloyd Ward, Co-Manager of Sterling H. Nelson & Sons
received a telephone call from an unidentified caller who asked
"Do you want your checks back?"

(TR 23-24).

Upon Mr. Ward's

affirmative answer, the caller asked if he would pay for the checks
Mr. Hard told the caller he would pay $500.00 and the caller said
"You will be hearing from me."

(TR 24-25).

The same day, Mr.

Ward received a second phone call at approximately 3:00p.m. from

the same caller indicating that he did not want the police involved,
that he had $60,000.00 worth of the business' checks and that he
wanted at least $5,000.00 (TR 24-25).

The caller also threatened

to Sponsored
'"torch
the place"' and destroy the checks if the police were
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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involved

(TR 24, 29).

Mr. T,,Jard received a third telephone call

on Monday from the caller which relayed information similar to the
second call on Saturday.
Ralph Nelson, Senior Manager of the business, received
six to eight subsequent telephone calls from an unidentified man
in the course of the same week concerning an agreement to receive
$5,000.00 in exchange for the checks

(TR 43).

On approximately

February 25, 1977, Mr. Nelson was instructed by the caller that
a substantial amount of checks would be left in a shopping cart
on the west side of the Grand Central building at 33rd South and
Main Street to prove that the caller had the balance of the checks.
(TR 34-35).

Mr. Nelson immediately went to the location and

retrieved the checks which totalled approximately $6,000.00 and
were made payable to the business (TR 35).
On the following Monday, the caller asked Mr. Nelson if
he was willing to pay $5,000.00 and if he would be willing to go
through an attorney in order to receive the merchandise, (TR 35-36
When Mr. Nelson consented to go through an attorney, the caller
informed him that it would cost an additional $500.00 which Mr.
Nelson agreed to pay (TR 36).

There was some discussion of using

the company's attorney but the idea was not pursued and no attorne:
was actually named in the discussions (TR 45-47).

At 11:30 p.m

of the same day, Mr. Nelson received a phone call setting up an
agreement as to the means of delivering the $5,500.00 and receiv: 11
the checks (TR 36, 47).

Mr. Nelson was called by Mr. Green of

the Salt Lake City Police Department on the following day and
told that the checks were in the oossession of the police depar
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ment (TR 36).
On the evening of February 28, 1977, Robert VanSciver,
an attorney in Salt Lake City, received a call from the appellant,
Verdean Carter.

Van Sciver had represented the appellant in the

past and was performing services with respect to a settlement of
a civil matter at the time (TR 51, 60).

The appellant asked Van

Sciver if he could deliver a package to Van Sciver's office and
if Van Sciver would give the package to somebody if they came to
redeem it from him.
(TR 52).

Mr. Van Sciver indicated that he would agree

The following day, March 1, 1977, the appellant went to

Van Sciver's office at approximately 8:15 a.m. with a package
where he met Van Sciver, who was on his way out the door.

The

appellant and Van Sciver went into the office where the appellant
placed the package on the floor

(TR 53).

The appellant told

Van Sciver to call the person whose name appeared on the checks
and that they would bring in some money and pick up the checks.

The

amount of money referred to was $5,500.00, $500,00 of which was
to be retained by VanSciver
the appellant "It smells.

(TR 53-54).

Mr. VanSciver told

I don't like this."

(TR 55).

Mr. Van

Sciver further stated that he thought the arrangement sounded like
an extortion plot, to which the appellant responded,
(TR 88).

··~.Jell,

it is."

Van Sciver told the appellant he intended to tell the

police "to cover my ass."

The appellant told VanSciver that the

person to whom the checks belonged did not want the police involved and that he didn't need to feel like he had to discuss it
with the police

(TR 55).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Van Sciver then went directly to the coffee shop in
the Metropolitan Hall of Justice and saw Captain Patrick of the
Salt Lake City Police Department whom he told about the package
(TR 56).

Van Sciver, on the same day, spoke with Deputy County

Attorney John Nielsen and Salt Lake City Police Detectives Young
and Stoner about the situation.

Without revealing the appellant's

name or his conversations with the appellant, Van Sciver told
them where the package was and that they could examine it

(TR 57)

Later the same afternoon, Van Sci ver telephoned appellant
at his place of employment at Z.C.M.I. Shoe Repair and told him
that the checks were in the hands of the police

(TR 66).

The

appellant said, "Don't worry I can still make it fly" and "I'll just
tell them to deliver the money to you;
hands of the police."

(TR 69).

that the checks are in the

VanSciver also assured the

appellant that under no circumstances would he disclose the
defendant's name

(TR 70).

Subsequently, Van Sciver was subpoenec

and ordered to reveal the appellant's identity, which he did (TR5f
The appellant was arrested by Officer Jake Green later
in the afternoon of March 1, 1977, at his place of employment and
taken to the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office for interrogation
(TR 76-77).
police

The appellant voluntarily gave a statement to the

(TR 78-79).

He stated that he was approached by an

individual two days earlier and asked if there was a way to havea
lawyer get some checks back to the company

(TR 79) .

The anpellant was advised by the individual that in retul
for his assistance, "they would take care of him," meaning there
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,
- may
6 contain
- errors.

was more than one person involved

(TR 84).

The appellant admitted

that he believed some type of fraud was involved in the arrangement;
that he went to Van Sciver's office with another individual and
that he delivered the checks to Van Sciver so that the checks could
be returned to their owner while the unidentified individual waited
in the car

(TR 82, 85-86).
At the trial, the appellant testified that an individual

advised him that he had a whole bunch of checks and he didn't
know how to get them back to the owners so he was going to destroy
them

(TR 125).

The individual stated that he had talked to the

owner who was willing to pay a reward for the return of the checks
and to go through a lawyer to get them back

(TR 126).

later saw the checks at the individual's home and
valued approximately $50,000.00

(TR 128) .

The appellallt

thought they

The appellant testified

as to his concern that the checks be returned to the owners because
a loss of $50,000.00 could bankrupt a business

(TR 131) .

The

appellant believed that the parties would give him a part of the
$5,000.00 paid by the owners and he stated he would have accepted
the money

(TR 130-131).

The appellant related his conversations

with Van Sciver in which he admitted that the transaction could be
extortion.

At no time did the appellant tell Van Sciver not to

return the checks if the money was not paid or attempt to retrieve
the checks when Van Sciver said he intended to call the police
(TR 131, 133).

The appellant told VanSciver not to contact the

police only because the individual who accompanied him to Van
Sciver's office said so

(TR 133).

The appellant did not believe

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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he was personally involved in crime and wished to remain anonymous
to avoid an embarrassing situation with the police

(TR 135).

It

was always the appellant's understanding with Van Sciver that Van
Sciver would not divulge his identity to the police

(TR 135).

Floyd Ledford, a police officer for Salt Lake City,
assigned to the Detective Division, testified in behalf of the
appellant

(TR 100-101).

Officer Ledford testified concerning

his acquaintance· with the appellant for six or seven years and his
work with the appellant as an informant over the past two years
(TR 101-102).

The officer stated that the appellant had provided

the police with several leads concerning the crimes in the region

and in one instance, the appellant's information led to the recover

(TR 102-105)

of approximately $100,000.00 worth of jewelry stolen

At the conclusion of the trial on Counts I and II of the
Information and after the jury had returned a verdict of guilty,
the jury was dismissed.

The appellant waived his right to a jury

trial on Count III of the Information, the Habitual Criminal Charge
and the matter was tried to the Court on June 8, 1977

(TR 201,

2C

The appellant made a motion to dismiss Count III on the grounds
that such prosecution in this case constituted a selective enforcement of the statute and presented evidence in support of the Motior
(TR 200) .
Gerald Kinghorn, Assistant County Attorney, testified
that the appellant was the first individual to be prosecuted unde'
the Habitual Criminal Statute since it was reenacted into law ir- ~S
He also stated there are no written guidelines setting forth 1-1hc
to use the habitual criminal prosecution (T~ 208).

Further, ~r

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Kinghorn could identify only one other person as being prosecuted
under that statute in Utah since 1970 (TR 208).
David E. Yocom, Deputy County Attorney for Salt Lake
County, testified that he was in charge of the Career Criminal program for Salt Lake County, a federally funded administrative test
program (TR 212).

He testified that only one other individual had

been charged with being a Habitual Criminal under the statute since
July, 1975 and that the Complaint against that individual was dismissed at Preliminary Hearing.

This was true despite the fact that

the Career Criminal program became effective in the Salt Lake County
Attorney's Office in July of 1975 and 260 individuals had been prosecuted under the program since its inception (TR 213).

According

to Mr. Yocom, there were seven criteria for determining persons to
be prosecuted under the program, including the criteria of two or
more convictions for serious felony offenses (TR 213).

Mr. Yocom

testified that none of these 260 were individuals against whom the
County Attorney could have filed and proven the elements of being
a Habitual Criminal pursuant to the statute (TR 214).

He noted that

some cases involving out-of-state and federal convictions were not
filed due to the difficulty of proving that the conviction was a
felony of the first or second degree (TR 216-217).

However, one of

the convictions relied upon in the appellant's case is a conviction
from the State of California (TR 217).
The prosecution submitted as Exhibit 1 an authenticated
copy of a judgment and conviction from the State of California naming
Verdean Ilas Carter as the defendant and showing that the defendant
pled guilty to the offense of Robbery (TR 218-219).

The Court

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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took judicial notice of Section 213 of the California Penal Code
which provides for a sentence of not less than five years for the
crime of First Degree Robbery

(TR 221-222).

Exhibit 2 reflectec

a Utah conviction of Verdean Ilas Carter showing that the defendant
entered a plea of guilty to the crime of Attempted Robbery and

was

connnitted to the Utah State Prison for a term of two and a half to
twenty years

(TR 219).

Based on the appellant's admission during the trial of
Counts I and II that he was the same Verdean Ilas Carter as named
in the Utah and California convictions represented by Exhibits 1 ar
2, the Court found the appellant guilty of Count III

(TR 137,

138, 223, 226).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE HABITUAL CRIHINAL STATUTE, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
§76-8-1001 (AS AMENDED 1975), IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
A.
THE STATUTE VIOLATES THE APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO
EOUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAHS AS PROVIDED IN THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDHENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES AND HIS RIGHT TO THE UNIFORM OPERATION
OF THE LAWS PROVIDED IN ARTICLE I, SECTION 24 OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.
The appellant first contends that the Habitual Crimina:
Statute is unconstitutional on its face because the legislature
vested the prosecution with unbric1led

discretion in its

enforci·e

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The statute provides as follows:
76-8-1001. Habitual Criminal -- Determination -Any person who has been twice convicted, sentenced,
and committed for felony offenses at least one of
which offenses having been at least a felony of the
second degree or a crime which, if committed within
this state would have been a capital felony, felony
of the first degree or felony of second degree,
and was committed to any prison may, upon conviction
of at least a felony of the secon degree committed
in this state, other than murder in the first or
second degree, be determined as a habitual criminal
and be imprisoned in the state prison for from five
years to life.
[Emphasis Added]
The choice of enforcement provided in the statute through interjectior
of the word ''may" discriminates against the appellant in violation
of his right to equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and
the right to uniform operation of laws as provided in Article I,
Section 24 of the Constitution of Utah.
The scope of discrimination permissible under the law has
been examined by the Utah Supreme Court.

In Hansen v. Public

Employees Retirement System Board of Administration, 122 Utah 144,
246, P.2d 591 (1952), Justice Crockett stated for the Court:
An act is never unconstitutional because of
discrimination so long as there is some reasonable
basis for differentiation between classes which is
related to the purpose to be accomplished by the
act. And it aoolies uniforml to all ersons within the c ass. State v. Mason,
Uta
0 , 7 P. d
920, 117 A.L.R. 330; Slater v. Salt Lake City, 115
Utah 476, 206 P.2d 153, 9 A.L.R. 2d 712.
(Emphasis
Added]
The Court affirmed the approach taken in the Hansen case
in Child v. City of Spanish Fork, 538 P.2d 184 (1975), where again
Justice Crockett wrote:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 11 -

. different treatment of individuals does
not necessarily violate the equal protection of
the laws assurances.
They may be treated differently
by the law or by legal procedures which divide them
into classifications, if the classifications have
a reasonable relationship to a proper and lawful
purpose, and if all ersons within the same class
are treated equa y.
Emp asis Ad ed
Although the statute permissibly defines a class of persons subject
to the provisions, it fails to insure the uniform and non-discrimin
tory treatment of the class of habitual criminals.

Through use of

the permissive word "may" in §76-8-1001, the prosecution is granted
license to abuse discretion and subjectively inflict the provisions
of the statute.

Appellant is not lacking authority for this positi

In State v. Cory, 204 Ore. 235, 282 P.2d 1054 (1955), the Oregon
Supreme Court reached the same conclusion with respect to that stat
habitual offender statute.

Similar to

~76-8-1001,

the Oregon

statute provided that upon a finding of the requisite prior convictions not involving crimes of personal violence, the district
attorney may file an information accusing the person of the previou
convictions.

The Court held that the portion of the statute giving

the district attorney discretion to determine whether to file an
information against a person previously convicted of a felony not
involving personal violence was unconstitutional under the equal
protection clause of the state and federal constitutions, Writing
for the Court, Justice Latourette stated:
. there is no yardstick or semblance of
classification which would enable the district
attorney to determine under what circumstances an
information should be filed.
The exercise of
absolute discretion is vested in the district
attorney in such a circumstance.
In other words,
the fate of persons, even to the extent of life
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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imprisonment, who have committed the same
acts under the same circumstances and in like
situations is determined by the whim and caprice
of the district attorney.,. 282 P. 2d at 1056.
The Utah Habitual Criminal Statute is equally deficient
in providing appropriate and concise guidelines for the uniform
application of the law.

Recent years have seen increasing demands

for control of the decision to prosecute by establishing guidelines
on standards to implement the avowed purposes behind the American
Criminal Justice System.

The benchmark

in this area is embodied

in the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice,
Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function §3.9.

The prosecution

of habitual offenders based on no standards runs afoul of the
constitution since it can serve none of the utilitarian purposes
demanded by the criminal sanction.

As is noted in the aforecited

A.B.A. Standards:
The charging decision is the heart of the
prosecution function. The broad discretion
given to a prosecutor in deciding whether to
bring charges and in choosing the particular
charges to be made requires that the greatest
effort be made to see that this power is used
fairly and uniformly.
(A.B.A. Standards, infra
§3.9 Commentary at 93). See also A.B.A. Code
of Professional Responsibility DR7-103(A).
In the present discretionary statureJ

§76-8-1001 fails

to insure the uniform operation of the law and the equal protection
of individuals culpable thereunder and therefore must be found
invalid on its face.
Appellant next contends that the Habitual Criminal Statute
was selectively and capriciously applied against him in violation
of his right to equal protec.tion of the laws.
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In Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962) the United States
Supreme Court considered a similar challenge to the West Virginia
recidivist statute.

Rejecting the Petitioner's claim, then Justic 1

Tom C. Clark speaking for the majority of a S-4 divided Court
stated:
" . . . the conscious exercise of some selectivity
is not in itself a federal constitutional violation.
Even though the statistics in this case might imply
a policy of selective enforcement, it was not
stated that the selection was deliberately based
upon an unjustifiable standard such as race,
religion, or other arbitrary classification.
Therefore grounds supporting a finding of a denial
of equal protection were not alleged.
Oregon v.
Hicks, [213 Ore. 619, 325 P.2d 794 (1958)); cf.
snQWQon v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944);
Yick Wo v.
Ho~kins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (by implication)."
(3 8 U.S. at &56]
It is nonetheless clear as indicated in Oyler v. Boles
that the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of Equal Protection of
the law applies as well to the enforcement of penal laws as it doe
in other contexts.

Thus, the prosecution of an individual in an

arbitrary manner violates the Fourteenth Amendment and such a
prosecution must be dismissed.
The seminal case in this area is that of Yick Ho v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064;

30 L.Ed. 220 (1886).

In tl:

case certain city ordinances, which regulated the business of
operating a laundry, although valid facially, were found by the
Court to be discriminatorily enforced against the Chinese popul~
In Yick Wo the Court noted that although a:
" . . . law itself be fair on its face and impartial
in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered
with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practicaL
to make unjust and illegal discriminations between
persons in similar circumstances material to their
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rights the denial of equal justice is still within
the prohibition of the Constitution." (118 U.S.
at 373, 374).
It becomes clear from Yick Ho and Oyler v. Boles that
raising a challenge of discriminatory enforcement of a penal statute
stands on firm constitutional soil.

The Courts have apparently

gone beyond a limited reading of Ovler v. Boles and have held the
Oyler does not preclude the granting of relief against intentional
and purposeful discrimination against an individual since such
conduct was not alleged in Oyler.

See Moss v. Hornig, 314 F.2d 89

(2d Cir. 1963) (opinion by Judge Lambard).

The case of United

States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973) gives such a reading
to the Yick Wo-Oyler line of decisions.

In that case the Seventh

Circuit reversed the District Court and held that the defendant
was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim of discriminatory
enforcement for failure to possess a draft card.

In so doing the

court did not require a discriminatory distinction based on the
traditional invidious classifications of race or religion but applied
Oyler in such a way so as to indicate that the potential chilling
effect on first amendment rights of such a prosecution falls within
the category of "other arbitrary classifications."
A similar result was reached in United States v. Steele,
461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972), which involved a conviction for
refusing to answer questions in a census report in violation of
13 U.S.C. §221 (a).

The defendant argued that he had been de-

liberately selected for prosecution because of his participation
in a census resistance movement.

The Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Circuit agreed that there was evidence that Steele had been
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singled out for prosecution on the basis of his exercise of
First Amendment rights and concluded that his conviction could not
stand under Oyler and Yick Ho.
Convictions were also reversed in United States v.
Crowthers, 456 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1972), on a finding that an
unlawful and discriminatory purpose precipitated the indictments.
The arrests in that case were for violations of a disorderly conduct regulation which prohibited loud and unusual noise and obstruction of passageways and a regulation forbidding the distribution of handbills without prior permission of the federal agency
in whose space the material was to be distributed.
The point that these cases make is that purposeful
discrimination in the enforcement of penal laws may be arbitrary
and hence unconstitutional under the

~

rationale even though

the discriminatory effect does not manifest itself in traditional
categories of race or religion.

See also People v. Utica Daw's

Drug Co., 16 App. Div. 2d 12, 225 N.Y.S. 2d 128 (1962).
In the instant case, the evidence shows that the appella:
was the sole individual prosecuted under the Utah Habitual Crimina
Statute in the two years since its reenactment.

This statistic

is particularly suspect in view of the fact that 260 individuals
have been prosecuted under the Career Criminal program alone dur:J
the same two years and one of the criteria for Career Criminal
treatment is two or more convictions of serious felonies.
Mr. Yocom, the Deputy County Attorney in charge of the
Career Criminal program, testified the Habitual Criminal charges
may not be filed against

so~e

defendants who have out-of-state
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convictions due to the difficulty of proof.

Yet the appellant had

an out-of-state conviction which was used against him.

Appellant

contends that the difficulty of proof of out-of-state convictions
is not a viable excuse since presumably the County Attorney has acces~
to the statutes of other states by which the classification of
the conviction can be as readily determined as it was in the instant
case.
The evidence supports the appellant's claim that the County
Attorney purposefully and intentionally singled out the appellant
for prosecution under the Habitual Criminal Statute while it has
declined to prosecute others equally culpable.

Such prosecution

was arbitrary and resulted in unlawful discrimination against the
appellant in violation of his rights to the equal protection of
the laws.

B.
THE HABITUAL CRIMINAL STATUTE ALLOl.JS FOR AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY BY THE
LEGISLATURE TO THE EXECUTIVE TO FIX AND/OR ENHANCE
PUNISHMENT FOR CRIME.
As noted previously, Utah Code Ann. §76-8-1001, 1002
(as amended 1975) grants discretion to the county attorney or
prosecuting authority to charge any criminal defendant who meets
the requirements of §1002 with being a habitual criminal, and
therefore subjecting such person to an enhancement of punishment
for whatever other crime he is convicted of.
"from five years to life."

Such enhancement is

The statute however, does not require
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I

il

the case of every individual who meets the criteria, but rather,
uses the permissive word "may" in §1001.

Appellant contends that

this discretion represents exactly the unconstitutional delegatic:
of authority by the legislature of the power to fix punishment
which was condemned by this Court in its recent decision in State
v. Gallion, _ _ _ Ut.2d _____

P.2d.~(Ut.

Sup. Ct. No. 14966.

Nov. 17 , 19 77) .
In Gallion, this Court struck down a section of the Utah
Controlled Substances Act which gave the Attorney General, a
member of the Executive Department, the power to define and fix
punishment for crime.

Writing for the majority, Justice Maughn

observed:
"In the Controlled Substances Act, the administrator
not only determines that a substance should be
controlled, he further schedules the substance,
which in effect, declares the magnitude of the
penalty and fixes the punishment. The administrator
is exercising an essential legislative function
which cannot be transferred to him." (No. 14966
at P.5)
Under Utah law, the various county attorneys are clear!)
members of the Executive Branch supervised by the Attorney Genera:
Utah Code Ann. §67-5-1 (1953) provides:
"It is the duty of the attorney general:
. . . (5) To exercise supervisory powers over
the district and county attorneys of the state
in all matters pertaining to the duties of their
offices, and from time to time require of them
reports as to the condition of public business
entrusted to their charge."
I t is clear from a reading of §76-8-1001, 1002 that the

court cannot on its own invoke the enhancement of punishment pro·
vided for.

The determination as to when the section is invoked
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rests soley within the discretion of the county attorney or other
prosecuting authority as the case may be.
Because Habitual Criminal Statutes are clearly enhancement
of punishment provisions rather than substantive crimes (see e.g.
Moore v. Mo., 1 59 U.S. 613, 40 L.Ed. 2301, 16 S.Ct. 179 and Graham
v. W. Va., 224 U.S. 616, 56 L.Ed. 917, 32 S.Ct. 583), the legislature
has allowed the county attorney or other prosecuting authority to,
in effect, fix the punishment of an appropriate offender.

This

permissive approach makes Utah Code Ann. §76-8-1001 and 1002 (as
amended 1975) an unconstitution delegation of authority which rests
exclusively within the legislative perogative.

As Justice Maughn

observed in State v. Gallion, supra:
'' . . . (T)he authority to define crimes and
fix the punishment therefore is vested exclusively
in the legislature, and it may not delegate that
power . . . A determination of the elements of
a crime and the appropriate punishment therefore
are, under our Constitutional system, judgments
which must be made exclusively by the legislature."
(Sup. Ct. Case No. 14966 at P.6) [Emphasis supplied]
Appellant urges a reversal of the trial courts judgment
of punishment pursuant to the Habitual Criminal charge and dismissal
of that charge.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE APPELLANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS ROBERT VAN SCIVER'S TESTIMONY
CONCERNING HIS COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE APPELLANT
BECAUSE THE COMMUNICATIONS HERE PRIVILEGED THROUGH
THEIR ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP.
The importance and sanctity of the attorney-client privi
is clearly recognized in Utah, as reflected by the provisions in
Utah Code Annotated §78-24-8(2) -- Privileged Communications,
§78-51-26(5).

Duties of attorney and counselors, and Rule 26 of

the Utah Rules of Evidence.

The general purpose of the privilege

is set forth in §78-24-8:
There are particular relations in which it is the
policy of the law to encourage confidence and to
preserve it inviolate. Therefore a person cannot
be examined as a witness in the following cases:
(2) An attorney cannot, without the consent of
his client, be examined as to any communications
made by the client to him, or his advice given
therein, in the course of professional employment, . . .
At the hearing on the Motion to Suppress in the instant
case, Mr. Van Sciver testified that he and the appellant had an
on-going attorney-client relationship (Suppression Hearing Transc
II).

Further, Mr. Van Sciver testified to his belief that the

appellant contacted him on this occasion because Van Sciver was a
attorney and the appellant sought his services in that capacity
(Suppression Hearing Transcript 10).

The appellant's position~

that his consultation with Mr. Van Sciver concerned a past crimE
The prosecution alleged that the communications between
the appellant and Van Sciver were not privileged under Rule 26\:
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1

of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

Rule 26 sets forth the standard

required before a communication can be removed from the realm of
privilege:
(2) Exceptions. Such privileges shall not
extend (a) to a communication if the judge
finds that sufficient evidence, aside from
the communication, has been introduced to
warrant a finding that the legal service was
sought or obtained in order to enable or aid
the client to commit or plan to commit a
crime or a tort,
Justice Cardoza examined this exception to the attorneyclient privilege in Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 53 S.Ct.
465, 77 L.Ed. 993, 1000 (1932):
To drive the privilege away, there must be
something to give colour to the charge; there
must be prima facie evidence that it has some
foundation in fact.
At the hearing, the prosecution presented no independent evidence

to support the contention that the communication was not privilegec
The appellant further contends that Mr. VanSciver's
exercise of judgment was faulty and premature.

Mr. Van Sciver

testified that his conversations with the appellant were quite
brief.

At no time before going to the police did Mr. Van Sciver

pause to examine the potential conflicts with his client, the
appellant, nor did he seek to ascertain the exact nature of the
appellant's involvement.

Rather, Mr. VanSciver permitted his

personal concurs to prevail over those of his client.

Such conduct

contravenes the role and duty of an attorney as set forth in the
statutes:
§78-51-26. Duties of Attorneys and Counselors.
It is the duty of an attorney and counselor:
(5) To maintain inviolate the confidences, and
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at every peril to himself preserve the secrets
of his client.
The fact that the communications related by Mr. Van
Sciver were incriminating to the appellant cannot warrant the use
of that evidence because it was secured in the breach of Mr. Van
Sciver's duty to the appellant.
Appellant does not dispute Mr. Van Sciver's propriety in
relinquishing the receipts to the police.

A similar result was

compelled by the Supreme Court of the State of Washington in
State v. Olwell, 64 Hash. 2d 828, 394 P.2d 681, 16 A.L.R. 3d 1021,
(1964).

In that case, the attorney refused to comply with a sub-

poena duces tecum requesting the production of knives in his
possession and control relating to his client, claiming the attorn
client privilege and the client's privilege against self-incrimina
tion.

In holding that the knife was obtained through a confidenti

communication by the client, the Court stated:
To be orotected as a privileged communication,
information or objects acquired by an attorney
must have been communicated or delivered to him
by the client, and not merely obtained by the
attorney while acting in that capacity for the
client.
[394 P.2d at 683]
The court held the subpoena duces tecum defective on its face and
therefore the attorney was not compelled to comply with it.

Howe1

the court further ruled the evidence was accessible to the proseo
tion for use in a subsequent criminal proceeding when certain cor.·
trols were applied:
"Such evidence given the attorneyduring legal
consultation for information purposes and used
by the attorney in preparing the defense of his
client's case, whether or not the case ever goes
to trial, could clearlv be withheld for a
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attorney, after a reasonable period, should,
as an officer of the court, on his own motion
turn the same over to the prosecution . . .
The prosecution, upon receipt of such evidence
from an attorney, where charge against the
attorney's client is contemplated (presently
or in the future), should be well aware of the
existance of the attorney-client privilege.
Therefore, the state, when attempting to introduce such evidence at the trial, should take
extreme precautions to make certain that the
source of the evidence is not disclosed in the
presence of the jury and prejudicial error is
not committed.
By thus allowing the prosecution
to recover such evidence, the public interest is
served, and by refusing the prosecution an
opportunity to disclose the source of the evidence,
the client's privilege is preserved and a balance
is reached between these conflicting interests."
[394 P.2d at 685]
Under the rule propounded in Olwell, the prosecution is entitled
to the receipts but it cannot divulge the source of the evidence
in a subsequent criminal proceeding.
The essence of the Olwell result is to maintain the
client's privilege as to identity.

Circumstances warranting the

application of the attorney-client privilege to the identity of the
client have been recognized by numerous courts.

Baird v. Koerner,

279 F.2d 623 (CA9, 1960), Exparte McDonough, 170 Cal. 230, 149
P.566 (1915), See generally 16 A.L.R. 3d 1047.

The application

of the privilege to the client's identity is most compelling where
the client retains the attorney with the specific purpose of
keeping his identity confidential.

The New York Court of Appeals

examined this situation in In Re Kaolan, 8 N.Y. 2d 214, 168 N.E.2d
660 (1960) and held that where an attorney is retained confidentially
by a client to pass certain information to a public investigating
body, he cannot·be jailed for contempt of court because he is willing
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to disclose the information but not his client's identity.

In

the instant case, the appellant did not wish communication to be
conveyed to the police.

However, his purpose in delivering the

receiptsto Mr. VanSciver parallels the client's motivations in
Kaplan in that the appellant's concern was that the receipts be
returned to the rightful owner.
In summary, the appellant's communication to Mr. Van
Sciver was privileged with respect to his identity.

The fact that

Mr. Van Sciver did not honor the privilege and vigorously protect
it when subpoenaed by the Court cannot operate to the benefit of
the prosecution.

The Court, therefore, erred in admitting this

evidence at appellant's trial and therefore appellant is entitled
to reversal.
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POINT III
THE APPELLANT'S CO~WESSION MUST BE SUPPRESSED
BECAUSE HIS A~~ST ~~S THE RESULT OF A PRIVILEGED
COMMUNICATION UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRED BY THE
PROSECUTION.
The appellant's statement to the police must be suppressed
as evidence because it was secured through the unlawful breach of
the attorney-client privilege.

The use of appellant's statement

following Mr. Van Sciver's unlawful disclosure of his identity is
similar to certain Fourth Amendment cases examined by the United
States Supreme Court.

Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 9

L.Ed. 2d 441, 83 S.Ct. 407 (lq63) held that verbal evidence derived
immediately from an unauthorized arrest must be suppressed as the
fruit of official illegality.

The United States Supreme Court

further held in Wong Sun the confession of another defendant admissib
because the "connection between the arrest and the statement had
become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint."
The Wong Sun doctrine was re-examined by the United States
Supreme Court in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 45 L.Ed. 2d 416,
95 S.Ct. 2254 (1975).

The facts in Brown were:

following an

illegal arrest, the defendant was taken to a police station where,
after being given the Miranda warnings, he made incriminating
statements concerning a murder of which he was subsequently convicted
The state supreme court held the statements admissible on the grounds
as the United States Supreme Court described it,
that the Miranda warnings in and of themselves
broke the causal chain so that any subsequent
statement, even one induced by the continuing
effects of unconstitutional custody, was adSponsored bymissible
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it was voluntary and not coerced in violation
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend~ents.
(422
U.S. at 597)
The United States Supreme Court reversed the state court ruling,
distinguishing the purposes of the exclusionary rule to effectuate
the Fourth Amendment from the interests and policies served under
the Fifth Amendment.

Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court,

stated:
. even if the statements in this case were
found to be voluntary under the Fifth Amendment,
the Fourth Amendment issue remains.
In order
for the causal chain, between the illegal arrest
and the statements made subsequent thereto, to
be broken, \~ong Sun requires not merely that the
statement meet the Fifth ~endment standard of
voluntariness but that it be sufficiently an
act of free will to purge the primary taint.
Wong
Sun thus mandates consideration of a state~ent's
admissibility in light of the district policies and
interests of the Fourth Amendment.
(422 U.S. at 602)
The Supreme Court set out several facts in addition to
the Miranda warnings to be considered in assessing the

voluntarine~

of a statement secured after an illegal arrest, including the
temporal proximity of the arrest and confession, the presence of
intervening circumstances and the purpose and flagrancy of the
official misconduct.
In the instant case, the appellant departed from his
attorney at 8:30a.m.

At approximately 1:00

p.~.,

he was telephore

by Mr. Van Sciver and advised that the receipts had been turned
over to the police but that his identity would not be revealed.
Later the same afternoon, the appellant was arrested at his place
of employment and taken to the Salt Lake County Attornev's Office
for interrogation.

Following a discussion with the oolice, the

appellant
gave
hisLaw statement
as to provided
his byinvolvement
(TR
154).
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The

appellant's arrest and confession parallel Brown v. Illinois in
that the confession was secured in close proximity to the unlawful
arrest and without any intervening circumstances indicating a
break in the causal chain.
by

~r.

Additionally, the misconduct exhibited

Van Sciver and the prosecution in breaching the appellant's

attorney-client privilege warrants the same rule of exclusion
anplied to illegal arrests in Fourth Amendment cases.

Historically,

the attorney-client privilege has been preserved to insure the right
of every person to freely and fully confer

with a skilled legal

counselor to secure adequate advice without apprehension of subsequent disclosure by the lawyer.

Baird v. Koerner, supra.

The

failure to exclude evidence obtained in breach of the privilege
would undermine the sanctity of the privilege and encourage prosecu
torial harrassment of attorneys who might succumb to pressure.
policy of insuring the legality of criminal investigations and
arrests mandates the exclusion of the appellant's confession and
reversal of the conviction.
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The

CONCLUSIO!l
This is a situation where the appellant sought the advice
of an attorney whom he had known and trusted for a number of years
in order to assist in the return of stolen property.

Because the

property was stolen, the appellant sought to maintain the utmost
confidentiality as to his identity to avoid an embarrassing situati
with the police.

As a result of his attorney's breach of the

attorney-client privilege, the appellant now faces imprisonment.
Compounding the dilemma, is the patently unconstitutional
enforcement of the Habitual Criminal Statute.

This conviction must

be reversed lest it set a dangerous precedent of vesting tyrannical
discretion in the hands of the prosecution.
For the reasons set forth herein, the appellant seeks
reversal and a new trial.

:-;!_cv~~~ J! J:rt[c"c

. Rez:ctfully su?mit.t// .. ' . ,

LARRY R.
Attorney

LER
or Defendant
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